Sudan’s political history has been marked by coups, counter-coups, and a persistent tug-of-war between military and civilian forces. Sudan now severed diplomatic ties with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), a country that was once a key partner after the dictator Bashir was ousted in 2019. The collapse stems from accusations: Khartoum alleges the UAE has fueled Sudan’s civil war by arming the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary group accused of ethnic massacres and atrocities. The conflict has killed over 150,000 people, displaced 12 million, and precipitated what is now considered the world’s worst humanitarian crisis. In May 2025, Sudan’s attempt at holding the UAE accountable came to an end as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) dismissed its case due to jurisdictional limits.
However, the suit accused the UAE of violating the Genocide Convention by supplying weapons and funding to the RSF, charges Abu Dhabi vehemently denies. The UAE has repeatedly denied providing arms to the RSF, while evidence from various rights organizations has claimed otherwise. Sudan’s current crisis has its root in the unstable power deal that brought rival military groups to power following the coup in 2021 that ousted the civilian-led transitional government that had been sharing power with the military since the 2019 revolution. The coup brought an end to Sudan’s supposed transition into democracy as the military took full charge, detaining civilian leaders and declaring a state of emergency.
The harmonious alliance between General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (head of the Sudanese armed forces) and General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (leader of the RSF) ended in 2023 over disputes on the integration of the RSF into the national army. The RSF, originally a Janjaweed militia responsible for Darfur’s atrocities, had grown into a quasi-private army with vast economic stakes. Sudan’s army-affiliated Defense Council has publicly declared the UAE an “aggressor state,” pointing to the provision of advanced weaponry used in deadly RSF attacks on Port Sudan.
In a televised statement, the Sudanese army leader Abdul Fattah al-Burhan vowed that “the army will defeat the militia and those who support it. We say to those who attacked the Sudanese people that the time for retribution will come and the people will prevail in the end.” Unlike the UAE’s covert interventions in Yemen or Libya, its involvement in Sudan initially relied on backchannel support for military leaders. However, as RSF attacks intensified, what began as quiet influence has since turned into growing tension, as Sudan’s leadership increasingly views the UAE’s involvement as a direct threat to its aspirations.
The UAE in Sudan: From Strategic Partner to Proxy Power
Between 2014 and 2019, the UAE operated as a major donor in Sudan. This strategy continued into 2019, when UAE aid surged to $543.2 million, with 99% targeting development sectors. Notable investments in this timeline included $250 million in direct budget support to Sudan’s Central Bank during the post-Bashir transitional period and large-scale agricultural projects. This approach changed after the military coup in 2021. UAE financial assistance dropped significantly to $78.9 million. According to political analyst Federico Donelli, Gulf monarchs have long had interests in Sudan, viewing it as a critical area for expanding their regional power. Sudan’s strategic location along the Red Sea and proximity to the Bab al-Mandab Strait place it at the heart of Red Sea geopolitics.
Controlling maritime trade routes and logistics infrastructure in this corridor is a primary goal for GCC states. One of the UAE’s most ambitious projects in the region was the construction of the Abu Amama port, which is part of a $6 billion deal with Sudanese authorities. Though it has been cancelled, control over such infrastructure would grant the UAE leverage over Bab el-Mandeb, a critical choke point for global trade. Beyond port infrastructure, sources report the UAE’s involvement in Sudan is due to the nation’s plentiful natural resources, particularly gold and arable land.
The nation’s fertile land has become central to the UAE’s food security strategy. The UAE imports approximately 90% of its food and has increasingly turned to overseas agricultural investments to combat food shortages. Emirate-aligned firms control around 50,000 hectares of arable land, with crops shipped through the Red Sea ports. Sudan’s gold trade plays a vital role in RSF-UAE deepening relations. Nearly all smuggled Sudanese gold is processed through the UAE, which acts as a laundering hub for integration into global markets. In 2022 alone, UAE imports of Sudanese precious metals totaled around $2.3 billion in revenues. This trade is largely controlled by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
The Future of Sudan-UAE Relations
The current development of Sudan-UAE relations is full of tensions, shaped by various reports and fuelled by the consequences of the ICJ’s dismissal of sudan’s case The UAE continues to deny allegations that it is providing weapons aid to Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF), dismissing claims from Amnesty International, the United Nations, and Sudanese authorities as “baseless” and lacking “substantiated evidence.” Salem Aljaberi, the UAE’s assistant minister for security and military affairs, rejected an Amnesty report that verified footage of RSF fighters using Chinese-made GB50A guided bombs and 155mm AH-4 howitzers in attacks on Khartoum and Darfur. The report cited data indicating that the UAE was the only known buyer of these weapons from China.
Nonetheless, the UAE countered this Amnesty International report, claiming these military equipments are not exclusive to the UAE and calling Amnesty’s conclusions “misleading.” Despite these denials, Sudan’s military government has accused the UAE of violating its sovereignty by backing the RSF, leading to a severing of diplomatic ties. The conflict has escalated with a surge in RSF drone attacks on key infrastructure in Port Sudan, including the city’s international airport, fuel depots, and power stations, disrupting critical aid deliveries.
Abu Dhabi maintains that it does not recognize Sudan’s current government as legitimate. This pattern is consistent with the UAE’s proxy warfare playbook documented in Libya and Yemen in an article titled “The UAE in Libya and Yemen: Different Tactics, One Goal,” in which deniability through third-party channels has been a consistent strategy. As seen in other conflict zones in Libya, Yemen, Egypt, etc., the UAE has claimed to maintain formal neutrality while illicit arms transfers go on, leveraging commercial networks and foreign middlemen to hide its role.
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) delivered a decisive blow to Sudan’s case against the UAE, voting 14-2 to reject provisional measures and to remove the case entirely from its General List, citing manifest lack of jurisdiction (MLoJ). The UAE reservation to Article IX of the Genocide Convention, which stops the ICJ jurisdiction over disputes involving the Convention’s interpretation as clear and comprehensive, was backed by a majority. The decision is similar to cases such as DRC v. Rwanda (2006), in which the Court upheld Article IX reservations while prioritizing state consent over accountability. According to a source titled “Judicial Restraint and Jurisdictional Clarity: Decoding the ICJ’s Decision in Sudan v. United Arab Emirates,” Yusuf has argued that the UAE’s reservation is unclear, omitting important language on state responsibility for genocide, while six judges in a Joint Partly Dissenting Opinion condemned the premature dismissal as a violation of Sudan’s right to a full hearing.
While Judge Gómez Robledo warned the court had abdicated its role as guardian of the convention by ignoring evolving international law on genocide accountability. Notably, the dissenters highlighted that only twice in 25 years had the ICJ invoked MLoJ to remove a case, both times when no jurisdictional arguments were even presented. The ruling exposes a critical tension, while the majority maintained that jurisdictional barriers don’t absolve states of substantive obligations, its procedural rigidity leaves allegations of UAE complicity in RSF atrocities, including the genocide of the Masalit people, unexamined. As Judge Simma noted, this undermines the Convention’s raison d’être by allowing reservations to shield states from judicial scrutiny.
With the ICJ’s door closed, Sudan’s recourse now hinges on political pressure or UN Security Council action, avenues unlikely to overcome the UAE’s economic and geopolitical leverage.