Togo, a country of western Africa. Lomé, the capital, it is situated in the southwest of the country and is the largest city and port. Gaining independence from France in 1960, Togo enjoys one of the highest standards of living on the continent owing to its valuable phosphate deposits and a well-developed export sector based on agricultural products such as coffee, cocoa beans, and peanuts (groundnuts).
Lomé has been an important transit point for a number of Togo’s landlocked neighbours. Its artificial harbour (the Autonomous Port of Lomé [PAL]) was inaugurated in 1968. A second port is located at Kpémé, about 22 miles (35 km) northeast of Lomé, and is used to handle phosphate shipments. Economically, the maritime domain is at the centre of Sub-Saharan Africa’s development and prosperity.
In West Africa, more than in other parts of the world, fish is a major source of food. In some countries, 90% of dietary protein comes from fish. This means that beyond the economic importance of the maritime domain, certain West African countries, especially the Alliance of Sahel States, depend on the importation of food products for the survival of their populations. Any interruption of access to ports poses a threat to food security in these countries. The maritime sector in West Africa is therefore crucial not only for the economy, but also for food security and sovereignty.
Lomé’s port is not just an economic asset—it’s a political instrument. By channelling Sahel trade, anchoring security partnerships, and embedding global shipping giants in Togo’s economy, the port gives Lomé leverage in regional diplomacy and buffers the ruling elite at home. The degree to which Tema and Lekki peel away transshipment—and how AES–ECOWAS tensions evolve—will determine whether Lomé’s quiet influence grows or plateaus. The port of Lome is becoming increasingly strategic as rival global powers make moves to secure access to the region, including landlocked Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, according to a report by the Independent. The deep-water port offers “unrivalled maritime access and proximity”.
The port’s development began in earnest during colonial times, but post-independence investments, including partnerships with private operators, have modernised it. These upgrades include advanced equipment for faster cargo handling and better logistics, making it a hub for transshipment—where goods are transferred between ships for redistribution across West and Central Africa.
The Alliance of Sahel States, known as AES in French which stands for Alliance des Etats du Sahel, was created in September 2023 by three West African landlocked countries: Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. Unlike ideological blocs of the past, the AES represents a pragmatic response to shared threats: terrorism, foreign interference, and economic fragility. For Togo, engagement wouldn’t signify alignment against any third party, but rather an evolution of its proven mediation role into a more structured framework for regional stability.
Thus, port activities constitute a driver of development for the economies of both coastal and landlocked countries. Today, sea routes are the means par excellence for transporting products of all ranges, particularly from industrialised countries, or in the opposite direction with raw materials to supply processing industries. In the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and UEMOA (West African Economic and Monetary Union) area, the ports of coastal countries constitute powerful levers for the countries of the hinterland – that is to say landlocked states such as Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger which form the AES organisation – to boost their economy.
Moreover, to satisfy the needs of these states, 90% of their goods take the sea route via the ports of Benin, Ivory Coast, Guinea, Ghana, Nigeria and/or Togo. For coastal countries, port activities contribute on average 20% of their GDP and 80% of their customs revenue. The government uses this advantage to host regional summits. Leaders from all over West Africa gather in Lomé to talk about trade, security, and political issues.
Togo’s also become a key player in conflict resolution and continental integration. President Faure Gnassingbé is getting noticed as a bridge-builder who can handle complex regional disputes. The diplomatic approach here is all about providing neutral ground for high-level talks. Lomé has hosted peace talks for conflicting parties in neighbouring countries.
Why does Lomé matter now?
Togo is one of these African countries, which shares borders with Ghana to the west, Burkina Faso to the north, Benin to the east and is bounded by the Atlantic Ocean in the south and has a total area of 56,785 km2. The country has a coastline of nearly 50 km long and the continental shelf area is about 1500 km2. Piracy, illegal fishing, unlawful immigration and smuggling plague several Gulf of Guinea countries. Bordering 20 countries and with 6,000 kilometres of coastline, the Gulf of Guinea is a key shipping route for a region that relies heavily on imports.
This is why the costs of piracy weigh so heavily on the region’s economic and trade potential, with direct and indirect costs estimated at US$1.925 billion annually for 12 Gulf of Guinea countries. With Gulf of Guinea piracy down from past peaks, foreign navies and governments court access and training ties that keep Lomé attractive to carriers. U.S.-led exercises and renewed deployments in 2024 underscore how maritime security spending links directly to the port’s value chain—and Togo’s diplomatic relevance. Several foreign companies and investors have been operating for years at the Port of Lomé.
In 2024, reports say, customs duties reached FCFA 35.4 billion, a 20.41% increase from the previous year, while VAT on imported goods rose significantly to FCFA 43.7 billion, a 105.16% increase from the first quarter of 2023. Furthermore, these increases come against a backdrop where the port of Lomé and the Togolese corridor have established themselves as a bypass route for goods destined for Niger, following the closure of the borders between Benin and Niger. The lifting of sanctions in February and the decision of the Niger authorities to keep the border closed with Benin have benefited Togo, which has stepped up its initiatives to facilitate trade.
Togo, a nation of around 8 million people, has been ruled by the same family for 57 years, initially by Eyadema Gnassingbe and subsequently by his son. Faure Gnassingbe has been in office since 2005 after winning elections that the opposition described as a sham. On May 6, 2024, the President of the Togolese Republic, Faure Essozimna Gnassingbé, promulgated a law revising the Togolese constitution. The constitutional revision law was approved by the National Assembly, which is dominated by one party, the Union for the Republic, which is under Gnassingbé’s control.
Also, due to the jihadist threat in northwest Benin, goods destined for Burkina Faso, from the Port of Cotonou, must now pass by Kara in Togo, which is safer than the Porga route in Benin. Lomé intends to take advantage of this opportunity, giving its Sahel customers a cheaper and safer option. While control over port appointments and contracts thus maps onto government strength.
The Great-power Port access and Security cooperation
The country’s commitment to regional stability shows in its close work with troubled nations. Togo’s neighbourly solidarity is clear in its support for Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger during their security struggles. Mediation efforts sometimes stretch beyond West Africa. Togo works with the African Union peacekeeping initiatives too. There’s a strong belief in African solutions for African problems. This attitude has earned Togo respect among leaders who value sovereignty and self-determination. Togo’s foreign policy walks a line between old friends like Paris and new ties with Washington and other global powers. Togo is moving to strengthen its position by building relationships with both Russia and the United States.
Across the continent, ports like Berbera in Somaliland, Kenya’s port of Mombasa and Walvis Bay in Namibia have also been drawing interest from powers such as China, Turkey, the UAE, and India. While the increase in volume of trade between Asia and West Africa has seen Lomé port transform into a key regional container port. Major ocean carriers, specifically the Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC), have responded by redeploying ultra-large container vessels (ULCVs) to the route. According to the report, this has come as a major boost for liner connectivity of West African ports including Lomé.
In view of these trade advantages, the U.S has pledged to expand its African market access through Lomé port. Moreover, in July 2025, the U.S. Embassy in Lomé, led by the Chargé d’Affaires, Richard C. Michaels, conducted a tour of the port facility. The delegation also held a meeting with the management of Lomé Container Terminal, LCT, to explore commercial opportunities for U.S businesses.
“With advanced deep-water capabilities, cutting-edge equipment, and an annual throughput exceeding 30 million tons, Lomé offers U.S businesses unmatched access to African markets. ‘’Ongoing infrastructure expansion, including a dry-port and industrial zone, further enhances the port’s role as a growing gateway,” commented U.S Embassy in Togo.
In the meantime, Russia, on the other hand, is pursuing a security-oriented approach. In June 2025, Togo and Russia signed a bilateral military cooperation agreement, covering joint training, equipment supplies, and emergency medical support. This deal builds on Russia’s expanding footprint in the Sahel, where it has supported military-led governments in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso through arms and training, often via groups like Wagner (now rebranded). Observers note that the agreement could grant Russia unfettered access to the Port of Lomé, providing a strategic Atlantic outlet in the Gulf of Guinea.
What to watch next
The port landscape in Africa is undergoing profound changes year after year. The ports of Lomé (1,91 million TEUs in 2023) and Tema in Ghana (1,9 million TEUs in 2024) are positioned as the main competitors and leaders in this part of Africa. These performances are the result of massive investments in recent years. In West Africa, as everywhere, competition is increasingly becoming a reality. Ports are becoming more and more ambitious.
For illustration, Lekki Deep Seaport has established international transshipment links to key West African ports, including Tema in Ghana, Abidjan in Côte d’Ivoire, Lomé in Togo and Cotonou in the Benin Republic. As Lekki ramps up and Tema wins first-call services, Lomé leans on speed, depth, and carrier relationships—pressuring Togo to keep investor-friendly policies and cultivate partners that protect sea-lanes.
The imposition of the import levy is expected to raise the cost of these goods, leading to a likely drop in exports to the AES countries. While Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso have left ECOWAS, they remain part of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). The trade agreement, which seeks to establish a single market for the continent’s 1.3 billion people with a combined GDP of up to $3 trillion, aims to eliminate tariffs on 90 percent of goods while addressing non-tariff barriers. This goal falls further out of reach.
Bottom line
Maritime security has increased in the Gulf of Guinea in the past decade, but achievements in rooting out piracy will be short-lived unless its underlying causes on land are tackled properly. In West Africa this means alleviating chronic lawlessness, tackling transnational organised crime, and improving economic prospects and political stability in the region.
The Gulf of Guinea’s strategic importance for the stability of coastal states and international maritime trade makes it too dangerous to neglect. Protecting the world’s 1.6 million seafarers and eliminating piracy in the Gulf of Guinea will be a momentous challenge that will take years of sustained effort by regional actors and the wider international community. Tackling piracy in the Gulf of Guinea will require both sustained political will at the national and regional levels and deeper and more effective cooperation among members of the international community.
Today, the port of Lomé welcomes on average around forty ships per month; and according to its manager, “one of the pillars of this growth is the contribution of our main client which is none else but Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC) which has made the Port of Lomé its preferred destination to serve Africa.” The world’s second largest ship-owner had clearly announced its investment ambitions, notably of more than $500 million by 2030, as above mentioned.
Overall, the Port of Lomé, which has gradually become since the arrival of LCT, the reference port in terms of transshipment in the sub-region – more than 70% of the containers handled are in transshipment – continues to widen the gap with its main competitors in this segment.
Conclusion
A deep-water free port, the Autonomous Port of Lomé (PAL) enjoys considerable assets which allow it to position itself as a real tool for economic integration and a development pole on the West African coast. The observation is that the port of Lomé operates in a very competitive environment, because it is in strong competition with the ports of Cotonou, Téma and Abidjan.
Since 2000, Togo has initiated profound changes in the governance of its port, with the aim of responding effectively to free trade agreements and attracting operators from landlocked countries. With the political turmoil following the sanctions imposed by the ECOWAS organisation on the Alliance of Sahel States after their military coups, the PAL, which remained opened for activities, became more frequented by these West African hinterland countries. The hinterland countries are involved in port activities within port communities.
Jael Otondi, a Kenyan political economist, told bird in an interview that African countries should treat such ‘geopolitical stunts’ with caution especially at a time when Africa’s single largest market, the AfCFTA begins to reshape intra-African trade flows. He argued that any ‘control over maritime gateways’ will dictate who shapes the next phase of Africa’s economic integration and who benefits most from it. “Africa must take the driver’s seat. The global courtship over Lomé should not just be about access. It should be about partnership, ownership, and long-term value for African economies,” Otondi added.
Lastly, despite the multiple assets available to the PAL, the weakness of communication networks, coastal erosion, strong competition from other ports in the West African sub-region –Cotonou, Téma and Abidjan – and poor governance hamper its activities. Thus, to respond more effectively to the requirements of globalisation, the development of infrastructure, the environmental issues, compliance with procurement rules, the improvement of communication networks, etc. should be key elements for the competitiveness of the Port of Lomé, experts concluded.