
Assessing the Socioeconomic and Political Implications of Post-Drought Food Insecurity in East Africa: A Regional Crisis Analysis
The East African region has a long history of political instability and conflict, which have had significant impacts on food security and agricultural production. Political conflict and civil war, which are common in the region, have compounded the challenges facing food systems. This is evidenced by the displacement of over 30% of pastoralists in East Africa due to climate change.
Global food insecurity is rapidly increasing. In 2021 an estimated 29.3 per cent of the global population (2.3 billion people) was moderately or severely food insecure while 828 million people in the world (10.5 per cent of the world population) faced hunger. There are significant regional disparities and Africa bears the heaviest burden.
Food insecurity, violent conflict and climate change have generated a steady increase in forced migration since 2011. In 2021 more than 32 million Africans were internally displaced, refugees or asylum seekers. An estimated 95 per cent of those displaced remain in Africa. Migration often increases pressure on resources in host areas, which can produce inter group tensions and conflict, particularly in areas with a history of violence and pre-existing competition over resources.
Drought – defined as “a period of abnormally dry weather long enough to cause a serious hydrological imbalance”, is the most complex and recurring hazard that can cause widespread impacts on global sustainable developments. The United Nations hints that drought could be the next pandemic if immediate actions are not guaranteed, as its impacts extend beyond a single sector or region and are exacerbated by the already warming climate.
The Horn of Africa is among the most conflict-affected regions of the world. Violent conflict and insecurity were the principal drivers of food insecurity in Ethiopia, Somalia and South Sudan. Most countries in the Horn have experienced some measure of violent conflict for decades. Protracted conflict undermines development gains and restricts access to life-saving humanitarian relief. Conflict and violence compound the effects of climatic shocks, for example, by creating additional needs. Drought and erratic rainfall drive conflict between and within communities throughout the region.
Nowadays, the region is facing one of the worst droughts in four decades, which is having a devastating impact on agriculture. Agricultural activity, including farming and pastoralism, is the backbone of the region’s economy and more than 80 per cent of the population is employed in the sector.
As farmers and pastoralists depend on rainfall to grow crops, and to feed and water their livestock, the region’s driest areas have seen a tremendous loss of livelihoods due to crop failure and livestock deaths. Therefore, studying the evolution of this recent drought, its impacts, and the interventions employed provides an opportunity to draw critical lessons for improving community resilience and preparedness.
The Scale and Drivers
The Global Report on Food Crises (GRFC) 2025 shows conflict, economic shocks, climate extremes and forced displacement continued to drive food insecurity and malnutrition around the world, with a catastrophic impact on many already fragile regions. In 2024, more than 295 million people across 53 countries and territories experienced acute levels of hunger – an increase of 13.7 million from 2023.
East Africa struggles with a profound challenge in ensuring food security amidst the convergence of climate change, economic crises, and conflicts. The region accounts for less than 3 percent of global emissions, but its communities are losing livelihoods, homes, and sometimes their lives. The economic shocks in 2025, the Sudan and South Sudan as well as Burundi continue to have some of the highest year-on-year inflation rates globally. Although inflation in Ethiopia eased in 2025, it remains elevated at around 14 percent, with high fuel costs impacting food production and transport.
The World Health Organization (WHO) noted that as families face severe food insecurity, many have left their homes in search of food and water, and pasture for animals. Large-scale displacement is often accompanied by a deterioration in hygiene and sanitation. Outbreaks of infectious diseases are a major concern, especially when combined with low existing vaccination coverage and health service availability.
As people become increasingly food insecure, they also must make the impossible choice between food and healthcare, even as nutritional deficiencies make them increasingly vulnerable to disease. This is particularly true for children, for whom the combination of malnutrition and disease can prove fatal. With malnutrition and displacement, the need for health services will increase as people become weaker and more vulnerable to disease.
Socioeconomic, Political and Security implications
Food insecurity can also contribute to violent conflict. Research has traced the pathways by which this happens, often starting from shortages that result from the effects of climate change and other environmental stresses; when the impact of the shortages cannot be alleviated, for example by government action, grievances, disputes and conflict often ensue.
Research has also shown that rising food prices, specifically of basic staples such as wheat, and food price volatility are strongly associated with social unrest. While food price rises can be a trigger of conflict, this is dependent on context and conditional on other context-specific drivers. The most commonly referenced compounding factors are state capacity and response, and power dynamics in markets.
Today, there is an additional factor. Many governments and central banks are being pressed to raise interest rates to curb inflation, which is accelerating in the shadow of the Covid-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine. However, this will increase the cost of borrowing and of servicing debt, which is particularly burdensome for low-income countries with fiscal reserves that have already been depleted by the pandemic.
In addition, food and energy imports will become even more expensive, causing distress for tens of millions of households, many of which will be forced to respond by eating less, selling off any productive assets or migrating. As coping mechanisms, these actions tend to further exacerbate vulnerability to food insecurity, violent conflict and climate change while at the same time increasing protection needs that national governments and sub-national authorities struggle to meet. The inability of the authorities to meet citizens’ needs heightens the risk of social unrest and political instability, while also providing armed groups with a recruitment opportunity.
Violent conflict and climate change cross borders and have knock-on and indirect effects in totally different areas to where their direct impact is experienced. The war in Ukraine and the sanctions imposed on Russia by many countries have dramatically increased energy and food prices in a short period. This is particularly worrying for the 25 African economies that import at least one-third of their wheat from Ukraine and Russia, 15 of which import more than half their wheat from these two countries.
The impact on food prices caused by disruptions to exports from these two major food-producing countries has been exacerbated by disruption to food production elsewhere caused by climate change-related weather extremes. Furthermore, the price spikes come on top of already rocketing food prices due to the Covid-19 pandemic, which has caused unprecedented chokepoints and delays in global supply chains.
The East African region has a long history of political instability and conflict, which have had significant impacts on food security and agricultural production. Political conflict and civil war, which are common in the region, have compounded the challenges facing food systems. This is evidenced by the displacement of over 30% of pastoralists in East Africa due to climate change.
The civil war in Sudan and South Sudan, the conflict in the Tigray region of Ethiopia, and the ongoing insecurity in Somalia are all examples of the political instability in the region. These conflicts have displaced millions of people, destroyed farms and livestock, and disrupted trade and food distribution networks, leading to severe food shortages and famine-like conditions in affected areas.
Key Findings
The Global Report on Food Crises (GRFC) 2025 September Update which provides data available as of 22 August 2025 on acute food insecurity, acute malnutrition and displacement in countries/territories with food crises indicated that the devastating social and economic impacts of conflict, especially in Sudan, as well as weather extremes, continue to drive the region’s severe food crises. The Sudan remains the region’s largest and most severe food crisis as the conflict entered its third year.
Available information suggests that famine conditions persist in several areas during the July to September lean season. The Sudan conflict is contributing to worsening acute food insecurity in neighbouring South Sudan, with catastrophe and an ongoing cholera outbreak among returnees. Escalating conflict and an economic crisis in the country also led to catastrophic conditions across Pibor county and Luakpiny/Nasir, Ulang and Malakal counties in Upper Nile. Nasir and Ulang are facing a risk of Famine (GRFC, September 2025).
In Somalia, drought and conflict-related displacement and reduced humanitarian assistance were expected to contribute to a worsening situation. In Kenya’s arid and semi-arid lands (ASALs), a projected deterioration was based on forecast below-average March–May 2025 rains, which occurred but not as expected. Despite overall ongoing recovery from the previous drought in Ethiopia, erratic rainfall in 2025 damaged crop performance in northern and central areas. Concern remains for populations in Amhara, Oromia and Tigray regions, due to the impact of past and ongoing conflict and insecurity, as well as for households in southern pastoral parts of Afar that have not recovered yet from past droughts.
Projected improvements for Burundi are for the post-harvest period. In Djibouti, despite an overall improvement, food security among the country’s refugees was expected to deteriorate, with the reduction of humanitarian assistance a contributing factor. In Uganda, the food crisis remained on par with 2024. Somalia, the Sudan and South Sudan were lagged as hunger hotspots in FAO-WFP’s early warning outlook for June to October 2025.
Moderate and severe drought conditions have materialised in northern and coastal areas of Somalia driving displacement. In Ethiopia, livestock production improved in some regions and the meher harvest was at near-average levels, while pastoral southern areas of Afar and northern areas of Somali recorded below-average rainfall.
Conflict/insecurity is the key driver in Sudan. Despite a relative stabilization in security in Al Jazirah, Khartoum and Sennar states allowing for IDP and refugee returns, conflict continued unabated in Darfur and Kordofan, triggering new displacements amid increasing attacks against humanitarian organizations. Intensified fighting around El Fasher town crippled access to medicine and food for its besieged residents. North Darfur, where famine was projected in several areas, is experiencing a cholera outbreak.
Any potential food security gains from improved agricultural production in 2024–25 in Sudan were tempered by conflict-induced trade disruptions, driving up production costs and cereal prices, amid reduced employment opportunities, which constrained food access. These vulnerabilities were likely to be exacerbated during the July to September 2025 lean season when households increasingly depend on markets.
In South Sudan, conflict and insecurity displaced households, disrupted humanitarian assistance, and limited access to farms and markets. Conflict and insecurity persist in parts of Ethiopia and Somalia, driving internal displacement. In southern Sudan, central and eastern South Sudan, and northern Ethiopia, early rainfall deficits during the June–September season affected crop planting. Forecast above-average rainfall for the remainder of the season should benefit agriculture and water access but increase flood risks, especially in South Sudan.
Conclusion
Achieving zero hunger is not just a humanitarian imperative but also an economic and social necessity. Food insecurity stifles economic growth, hinders development, and weakens national security. Conversely, a food-secure region fosters economic prosperity, promotes social stability, and empowers communities to thrive.
In the specific context of the Horn of Africa, achieving zero hunger holds particular significance. The region is home to some of the world’s most vulnerable populations, and the consequences of inaction are severe. Ensuring food security for all is not only crucial for saving lives but also for building a stronger, more resilient future for the region.
East African governments can and must join cooperative efforts to address the geopolitical tensions that lead to global crises; and they can and must join in with cooperative efforts to address the causes of climate change. They have played no part in causing these problems but have an enormous stake in resolving them.
In addition, East African governments, along with the private sector and civil society, should look to their own region and countries. Africans need their countries and communities to be more resilient—less vulnerable to globally driven pressures in order to be able to cope better with local ones. They also need the pressures of violent conflict to be eased. Peace is an essential precondition for advances on every other front.
In taking action, African governments and communities need and deserve international support from bilateral donors, international financial institutions (IFIs) and the UN and other agencies to finance the activities required to build resilience, support conflict resolution and peacebuilding, and work in partnership to make the transition from humanitarian assistance to sustained and sustainable development.
Previous studies on this subject matter emphasize the importance of continuous investment in adaptive measures, timely and informed decision-making, and targeted interventions based on specific regional needs, taking into account potential trade-offs resulting from these interventions. Structural investments (e.g. education, infrastructure, access to credit) are needed to reduce vulnerability of the communities.
Improved understanding of socio-economic impacts is critical in designing effective drought early warning systems and the development of impact triggers and thresholds for anticipatory action. By implementing these strategies, communities, governments, and organisations can work together to reduce the impacts of future droughts and build more resilient societies.