Will Somaliland’s recognition by Israel Affect Peace and Stability in the Horn of Africa?

The Horn of Africa is a region of great diversity and contrast. It is inhabited by different ethnic, religious, linguistic, and cultural groups. Unfortunately, this diversity was not to become a gratifying source of mutually enriching inter-relationships. On the contrary, it has generated deep-seated antagonisms, distrust, and ill-will. It has also nurtured fierce nationalistic values, beliefs, and attitudes which affect and, in turn, have been exacerbated by the political and ideological differences of the states of the region.

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, European colonial powers fought to dominate the Horn of Africa. The British seized the area between Ethiopia and the Gulf of Aden, now claimed by Somaliland. The Italians took over the lands to the east and south, on the Indian Ocean. Upon independence in 1960, the two regions united to form the nation of Somalia, with its capital, Mogadishu, in the south. But many people in the former British territory soon felt marginalized and neglected.

By the 1980s, political exclusion and repression under the dictator Mohamed Siad Barre had fueled an armed uprising in the north. According to BBC, the move followed a secessionist struggle during which Siad Barre’s forces pursued rebel guerrillas in the territory. Tens of thousands of people were killed and towns were flattened. When Mr. Barre was overthrown and the central government collapsed in 1991, Somaliland’s leaders declared the union dissolved.

Somaliland, has about five million people. Those in favour of Somaliland’s independence argue that the region is predominantly populated by those from the Isaaq clan – an ethnic difference from the rest of Somalia. Today, the Isaaq clan controls much of the political and economic landscape.

Before now, the Somaliland government asserts that it meets most of the requirements of a sovereign democratic state: it holds free and fair elections, has its own currency and security forces, and issues its own passports. It also says that its independence claim is consistent with a longstanding norm of the African Union and its predecessor that colonial-era borders should be maintained.

However, many countries have encouraged the breakaway state’s elections and economic development, but none have recognised Somaliland. While some experts see historical and geopolitical reasons for countries such as Ethiopia and Kenya to take this step, others say the African Union (AU) would have to be the first to do so.

In 2024, Ethiopia and Somaliland sign a memorandum of understanding for landlocked Ethiopia to use one of Somaliland’s ports. Somalia describes the agreement as an act of “aggression.”. Somalia, angered by the deal, expelled Ethiopian diplomats, pushed the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops under the African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia (ATMIS), and agreed to the deployment of Egyptian forces in their stead, risking further destabilisation of the already volatile Horn of Africa region.

In late December 2025, Israel  took the controversial decision to recognise the breakaway state of Somaliland as an independent nation. Israel’s announcement triggered broad regional and international pushback, including statements by Egypt, Jordan, Djibouti, Saudi Arabia and Türkiye, as well as a joint statement by 20 Middle Eastern and African countries rejecting and condemning the action. Regional organisations and partners — including the League of Arab States, the Eastern African Community, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the European Union — reiterated the need to respect Somalia’s unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Why did Israel recognise Somaliland?

On 26 December, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced Israel’s “official recognition” of “Somaliland” as an independent and sovereign State. Likewise, Netanyahu congratulated Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi, known as Abdirahman Cirro, during a video call, praising his “leadership and commitment to promoting stability and peace” and inviting him to visit Israel.

Media report noted that, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar aforementioned that the agreement followed a year of extensive dialogue between the two governments and was based on a joint decision by Netanyahu and Cirro to establish full ties, including the appointment of ambassadors and the opening of embassies in both countries. “We will work together to promote the relations between our countries and nations, regional stability and economic prosperity,” Saar wrote on social media, adding that he had instructed his ministry to immediately institutionalise ties across a wide range of fields.

Also, Cirro welcomed the development as a “historic moment”, expressing readiness for Somaliland to join the Abraham Accords. The Somaliland president said the move “marks the beginning of a strategic partnership that advances mutual interests, strengthens regional peace and security, and delivers shared benefits to all stakeholders”.

The Risks for Peace and Conflict

In the meantime, the supposed acknowledgement of Somaliland by Israel would represent an epochal geopolitical inflection point in the Horn of Africa. Nevertheless, Somalia considers Somaliland to be an integral part of its territory. The government in Somalia’s capital city, Mogadishu, has repeatedly said that any recognition of Somaliland’s independence would contravene Somalia’s sovereignty. Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has also characterised Israel’s declaration as an “existential threat” to his country’s unity.

All the same, analysts say there are strategic reasons for Israel’s declaration. “Israel requires allies in the Red Sea region for many strategic reasons, among them the possibility of a future campaign against the Houthis,” Israeli think tank the Institute for National Security Studies said, referring to Yemen’s Iran-backed rebels, in a paper in November, 2025. “Somaliland is an ideal candidate for such cooperation as it could offer Israel potential access to an operational area close to the conflict zone.” Israel repeatedly struck targets in Yemen after the Gaza war broke out in October 2023, in response to Houthi attacks on Israel that the rebels said were in solidarity with Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.

Last year, reports emerged linking potential recognition of Somaliland to plans for ethnically cleansing Palestinians in Gaza and forcibly moving them to the African region. However, Israel did not comment on the reports, but at the time, Somaliland said that any move by Israel to recognise its independence would not have anything to do with the Palestinian issue. Both Somalia and the Palestinian Authority have suggested Israel’s recognition of Somaliland could be linked to a plan to displace Palestinians. In response to Israel recognising Somaliland, the Houthis warned that any Israeli presence in Somaliland would be considered a “military target” for their forces.

Impacts and Implications to the Region

In recent years, Somaliland developed ties with the United Arab Emirates – a signatory to the Abraham Accords – and Taiwan as it sought international acceptance. While prominent figures within US President Donald Trump’s Republican Party, including Senator Ted Cruz, have been vocal advocates for deepened ties between Somaliland and Israel. Cruz has repeatedly urged the US to recognise Somaliland.

Furthermore, in August, Trump signalled that he was preparing to move on the issue when asked about Somaliland during a White House news conference. “Another complex one, but we’re working on that one, Somaliland,” he said. The US, as yet, has not changed its position on the issue. The announcement comes amid dampening US interest in Somalia, with Trump repeatedly carrying out verbal attacks on the country and its president.

However, the move carries significant risks. By undermining the territorial integrity of Somalia, Israel has unleashed tensions that could destabilise the Horn. Somalia’s central government is fragile and still fighting jihadist insurgencies; an added dispute over the north risks diverting limited resources. There is concern that Somalia’s leaders might react by further breaking ties with Israel or even those moderate Arab states aligned with it, and by rallying internal factions under a nationalist banner.

In Somaliland itself, what was long a quiet status quo could be disrupted. A protest movement might emerge among clans who favour unity with Somalia or among Islamist elements that oppose ties with Israel. It is conceivable that Somalia could attempt to assert its claim militarily or through proxy forces in eastern Somaliland (the Sool and Sanaag regions, which both administrations claim) – though this would risk open conflict with one of the few relatively stable parts of Somalia.

In the wider region, the move could intensify competition among regional powers. For example, Ethiopia, which has security interests in Somaliland’s stability, may find its delicate balancing act upset. And even though Israel likely did not directly intend to damage cooperation against common threats (Somalia and Israel both worry about instability and terrorism), the heightened animosity might complicate such security ties.

Lastly, Israel’s recognition of Somaliland would be geopolitically important but strategically difficult. While it could promote security cooperation and reward effective governance, it also risks intensifying regional contention, weakening Somali unity, and introducing Middle Eastern crises into the Horn of Africa.